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Abstract—In this paper, we present a Non-Bayesian conditioning rule for belief revision. This rule is truly Non-Bayesian in
the sense that it doesn’t satisfy the common adopted principle
that when a prior belief is Bayesian, after conditioning by X,
Bel(X|X) must be equal to one. Our new conditioning rule for
belief revision is based on the proportional conflict redistribution
rule of combination developed in DSmT (Dezert-Smarandache
Theory) which abandons Bayes’ conditioning principle. Such
Non-Bayesian conditioning allows to take into account judiciously
the level of conflict between the prior belief available and
the conditional evidence. We also introduce the deconditioning
problem and show that this problem admits a unique solution
in the case of Bayesian prior; a solution which is not possible
to obtain when classical Shafer and Bayes conditioning rules are
used. Several simple examples are also presented to compare
the results between this new Non-Bayesian conditioning and the
classical one.

to combine conflicting sources of evidences1 and because
Dempster’s rule often considered as a generalization of Bayes
rule is actually not deconditionable (see examples in the
sequel), contrariwise to PCR5, that’s why we utilize PCR5.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly
recall Dempster’s rule of combination and Shafer’s Conditioning Rule (SCR) proposed in Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST)
of belief functions [16]. In section III, we introduce a new
Non-Bayesian conditioning rule and show its difference with
respect to SCR. In section IV, we introduce the dual problem,
called the deconditioning problem. Some examples are given
in section V with concluding remarks in section VI.

Keywords: Belief functions, conditioning, deconditioning,
probability, DST, DSmT, Bayes rule.

In DST, a normalized basic belief assignment (bba) m(.)
is defined as a mapping from the power set 2Θ of the
finite discrete frame
P of discernment Θ into [0, 1] such that
m(∅) = 0 and
X∈2Θ m(X) = 1. Belief and plausibility
functions are in one-to-one correspondence
with m(.) and are
P
respectively
defined
by
Bel(X)
=
Z∈2Θ ,Z⊆X m(Z) and
P
P l(X) = Z∈2Θ ,Z∩X6=0 m(Z). They are usually interpreted
as lower and upper bounds of a unknown measure of subjective
probability P (.), i.e. Bel(X) ≤ P (X) ≤ P l(X) for any X. In
DST, the combination of two independent sources of evidence
characterized by m1 (.) and m2 (.) is done using Dempster’s
rule as follows2 :
P
X1 ,X2 ∈2Θ m1 (X1 )m2 (X2 )
X1 ∩X2 =X
P
mDS (X) =
(1)
1 − X1 ,X2 ∈2Θ m1 (X1 )m2 (X2 )

II. S HAFER ’ S

I. I NTRODUCTION
The question of the updating of probabilities and beliefs
has yielded, and still yields, passionate philosophical and
mathematical debates [3], [6], [7], [9], [12], [13], [17], [20],
[22] in the scientific community and it arises from the
different interpretations of probabilities. Such question has
been reinforced by the emergence of the possibility and the
evidence theories in the eighties [4], [16] for dealing with
uncertain information. We cannot browse in details here all
the different authors’ opinions [1], [2], [8], [10], [14], [15]
on this important question but we suggest the reader to start
with Dubois & Prade survey [5]. In this paper, we propose a
true Non-Bayesian rule of combination which doesn’t satisfy
the well-adopted Bayes principle stating that P (X|X) = 1
(or Bel(X|X) = 1 when working with belief functions).
We show that by abandoning such Bayes principle, one can
take into account more efficiently in the conditioning process
the level of the existing conflict between the prior evidence
and the new conditional evidence. We show also that the
full deconditioning is possible in some specific cases. Our
approach is based on belief functions and the Proportional
Conflict Redistribution (mainly PCR5) rule of combination
developed in Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) framework
[18]. Why we use PCR5 here? Because PCR5 is very efficient

CONDITIONING RULE

X1 ∩X2 =∅

Shafer’s conditioning rule3 (SCR) is obtained as the result
of Dempster’s combination of the given prior bba m1 (.)
with the conditional evidence, say Y represented by a source
m2 (.) only focused on Y , that is such that m2 (Y ) = 1. In
other words, m(X|Y ) = mDS (X) = (m1 ⊕ m2 )(X) using
m2 (Y ) = 1 and where ⊕ symbol denotes here Dempster’s
1 Due to space limitation, we do not present, nor justify again PCR5 w.r.t.
other rules since this has been widely explained in the literature with many
examples and discussions, see for example [18], Vol. 2. and our web page.
2 assuming that the numerator is not zero (the sources are not in total
conflict).
3 also called Dempster’s conditioning by Glenn Shafer in [16].

11

Advances and Applications of DSmT for Information Fusion. Collected Works. Volume 4

fusion rule (1). It can be shown [16] that the conditional belief
and the plausibility are given by4 :
X
Bel1 (X ∪ Ȳ ) − Bel1 (Ȳ )
Bel(X|Y ) =
mDS (Z|Y ) =
1 − Bel1 (Ȳ )
Θ

All fractions in (4) having zero denominators are discarded.
The extension and a variant of (4) (called PCR6) for
combining s > 2 sources and for working in other fusion
spaces is presented in details in [18]. Basically, in PCR5 the
partial conflicting masses are redistributed proportionally to
the masses of the elements which are involved in the partial
conflict only, so that the specificity of the information is
entirely preserved through this fusion process. It has been
clearly shown in [18], Vol. 3, chap. 1 that Smets’ rule7 is
not so useful, nor cogent because it doesn’t respond to new
information in a global or in a sequential fusion process.
Indeed, very quickly Smets fusion result commits the full
of mass of belief to the empty set!!! In applications, some
ad-hoc numerical techniques must be used to circumvent this
serious drawback. Such problem doesn’t occur with PCR5
rule. By construction, other well-known rules like Dubois &
Prade, or Yager’s rule, and contrariwise to PCR5, increase
the non-specificity of the result.

Z∈2
Z⊆X

P l(X|Y ) =

X
Z∈2Θ
Z∩X6=∅

P l1 (X ∩ Y )
mDS (Z|Y ) =
P l1 (Y )

(2)
(3)

When the belief is Bayesian5 , i.e. Bel(.|Y ) = P l(.|Y ) =
P (.|Y ), SCR reduces to classical conditional probability definition (Bayes formula), that is P (X|Y ) = P (X ∩ Y )/P (Y ),
with P (.) = m1 (.). Note that when Y = X and as soon
as Bel(X̄) < 1, one always gets from (2), Bel(X|X) = 1
because Bel1 (X ∪ Ȳ ) = Bel1 (X ∪ X̄) = Bel1 (Θ) = 1.
For Bayesian belief, this implies P (X|X) = 1 for any X
such that P1 (X) > 0, which we call Bayes principle. Other
alternatives have been proposed in the literature [8], [15],
[21], but almost all of them satisfy Bayes principle and they
are all somehow extensions/generalization of Bayes rule. A
true Non-Bayesian conditioning (called weak conditioning)
was however introduced by Planchet in 1989 in [14] but
it didn’t bring sufficient interest because Bayes principle
is generally considered as the best solution for probability
updating based on different arguments for supporting such
idea. Such considerations didn’t dissuade us to abandon Bayes
principle and to explore new Non-Bayesian ways for belief
updating, as Planchet did in nineties. We will show in next
section why Non-Bayesian conditioning can be interesting.

Properties of PCR5:
• (P0): PCR5 rule is not associative, but it is quasiassociative (see [18], Vol. 2).
• (P1): PCR5 Fusion of two non Bayesian bba’s is a non
Bayesian bba.
Example: Consider Θ = {A, B, C} with Shafer’s model
and with the two non Bayesian bba’s m1 (.) and m2 (.)
given in Table I. The PCR5 fusion result (rounded at the
fourth decimal) is given in the right column of the Table
I. One sees that mP CR5 (.) in a non Bayesian bba since
some of its focal elements are not singletons.

III. A N ON BAYESIAN C ONDITIONING RULE
Before presenting our Non Bayesian Conditioning Rule,
it is important to recall briefly the Proportional Conflict
Redistribution Rule no. 5 (PCR5) which has been proposed
as a serious alternative of Dempster’s rule [16] in DezertSmarandache Theory (DSmT) [18] for dealing with conflicting
belief functions. In this paper, we assume working in the same
fusion space as Glenn Shafer, i.e. on the power set 2Θ of
the finite frame of discernment Θ made of exhaustive and
exclusive elements.

Table I
PCR5 FUSION OF TWO NON BAYESIAN BBA’ S .
Focal Elem.
A
B
C
A∪B
A∪C
A∪B∪C

•

A. PCR5 rule of combination
Definition: Let’s m1 (.) and m2 (.) be two independent6 bba’s,
then the PCR5 rule of combination is defined as follows
(see [18], Vol. 2 for details, justification and examples) when
working in power set 2Θ : mP CR5 (∅) = 0 and ∀X ∈ 2Θ \ {∅}
X
mP CR5 (X) =
m1 (X1 )m2 (X2 )+
X

[

X2 ∈2Θ
X2 ∩X=∅

X1 ,X2 ∈2Θ
X1 ∩X2 =X
m1 (X)2 m2 (X2 )

m1 (X) + m2 (X2 )

+

m2 (X)2 m1 (X2 )
] (4)
m2 (X) + m1 (X2 )

m1 (.)
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.3
0
0.3

m2 (.)
0.2
0.1
0.2
0
0.5
0

mP CR5 (.)
0.3850
0.1586
0.1990
0.0360
0.2214
0

(P2): PCR5 Fusion of a Bayesian bba with a non Bayesian
bba is a non Bayesian bba in general8.
Example: Consider Θ = {A, B, C} with Shafer’s model
and Bayesian and a non Bayesian bba’s m1 (.) and m2 (.)
to combine as given in Table II. The PCR5 fusion result
is given in the right column of the Table II. One sees that
mP CR5 (.) is a non Bayesian bba since some of its focal
elements are not singletons.
This property is in opposition with Dempster’s rule
property (see Theorem 3.7 p. 67 in [16]) which states that
if Bel1 is Bayesian and if Bel1 and Bel2 are combinable,
then Dempster’s rule provides always a Bayesian belief
function. The result of Dempster’s rule noted mDS (.) for

7 i.e.

the non normalized Dempster’s rule.
some cases, it happens that Bayesian ⊕ Non-Bayesian = Bayesian. For
example, with Θ = {A, B, C}, Shafer’s model, m1 (A) = 0.3, m1 (B) =
0.7 and m2 (A) = 0.1, m2 (B) = 0.2, m2 (C) = 0.4 and m2 (A∪B) = 0.3,
one gets mP CR5 (A) = 0.2162, mP CR5 (B) = 0.6134 and mP CR5 (C) =
0.1704 which is a Bayesian bba.
8 In

4 Ȳ

denotes the complement of Y in the frame Θ.
focal elements of m1 (.|Y ) are singletons only.
6 i.e. each source provides its bba independently of the other sources.
5 the
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Table II
PCR5 FUSION OF BAYESIAN AND N ON BAYESIAN BBA’ S .
Focal Elem.
A
B
C
A∪C

m1 (.)
0.1
0.2
0.7
0

m2 (.)
0
0.3
0.2
0.5

mDS (.)
0.0833
0.1000
0.8167
0

mP CR5 (.)
0.0642
0.1941
0.6703
0.0714

X2 ∈2Θ
X∩X2 =∅

Θ

X2 ∈2
X∩X2 =∅

X2 ∩Y =∅

S3PCR5 (X, Y ) = δ(X =
6 Y ) · 0 +δ(X = Y )
|
{z
}
0

X

= δ(X = Y ) ·

X2 ∈2Θ
X2 ∩Y =∅

mP CR5 (.)
0.2037
0.0567
0.7396

m(X k Y ) =

X

m1 (X2 )
1 + m1 (X2 )

m1 (X2 )
1 + m1 (X2 )

m1 (X1 )+δ(X∩Y = ∅)·
X

+ δ(X = Y ) ·

X2 ∈2Θ
X2 ∩Y =∅

m1 (X)2
1 + m1 (X)

m1 (X2 )
1 + m1 (X2 )

(9)

m(∅ k Y 6= ∅) = 0 by definition, since PCR5 fusion doesn’t
commit mass on the empty set. m(X k ∅) is kept undefined11
since it doesn’t make sense to revise a bba by an impossible
event. Based on the classical definitions of Bel(.) and P l(.)
functions [16], one has:
X
Bel(X k Y ) =
m(Z k Y )
(10)

m(X k Y ) = S1PCR5 (X, Y ) + S2PCR5 (X, Y ) + S3PCR5 (X, Y ) (5)

Z∈2Θ
Z⊆X

with

P l(X k Y ) =
m1 (X1 )m2 (X2 )

X2 ∈2Θ
X2 ∩Y =∅

X1 ∈2Θ
X1 ∩Y =X

Here9 we follow the footprints of Glenn Shafer in the sense
that we consider the conditioning as the result of the fusion
of any prior mass m1 (.) defined on 2Θ with the bba m2 (.)
focused on the conditional event Y 6= ∅, i.e. m2 (Y ) = 1.
We however replace Dempster’s rule by the more efficient10
Proportional Conflict Redistribution rule # 5 (PCR5) given by
(4) proposed in DSmT [18]. This new conditioning rule is
not Bayesian and we use the symbol k (parallel) instead of
classical symbol | to avoid confusion in notations. Let’s give
the expression of m(X k Y ) resulting of the PCR5 fusion of
any prior bba m1 (.) with m2 (.) focused on Y . Applying (4):

S1 (X, Y ) ,

X

Finally, m(X k Y ) for X 6= ∅ and Y 6= ∅ are given by

B. A true Non Bayesian conditioning rule

X

2

Finally, S3PCR5 (X, Y ) can be written as

Table III
PCR5 FUSION OF TWO BAYESIAN BBA’ S .

PCR5

(8)

X1 ∩Y =X

Example: Θ = {A, B, C} with Shafer’s model and let’s
consider Bayesian bba’s given in the next Table. The
result of PCR5 fusion rule is given in the right column
of Table III. One sees that mP CR5 (.) is Bayesian since
its focal elements are singletons of the fusion space 2Θ .

mDS (.)
0.0870
0
0.9130

m1 (X2 )
m2 (X) + m1 (X2 )

m1 (X)
, and the term
S2PCR5 (X, Y ) equals δ(X ∩ Y = ∅) · 1+m
1 (X)
PCR5
S3 (X, Y ) can be expressed depending on the value of X
with respect to the conditioning term Y :
• If X 6= Y then m2 (X 6= Y ) = 0 (by definition), and
thus S3PCR5 (X, Y ) = 0.
• If X = Y then m2 (X = Y ) = 1 (by definition), and
P
m1 (X2 )
thus S3PCR5 (X, Y ) =
X2 ∈2Θ 1+m1 (X2 )

(P3): PCR5 Fusion of two Bayesian bba’s is a Bayesian
bba (see [18], Vol. 2, pp. 43–45 for proof).

m2 (.)
0.4
0
0.6

(7)

Since Y is the single focal P
element of m2 (.), the term
S1PCR5 (X, Y ) in (5) is given by
X1 ∈2Θ m1 (X1 ), the term

– With PCR5 rule:
Bayesian ⊕ Non-Bayesian = Non-Bayesian (in general)

m1 (.)
0.1
0.2
0.7

m2 (X2 )
m1 (X) + m2 (X2 )

where m2 (Y ) = 1 for a given Y 6= ∅.

Bayesian ⊕ Non-Bayesian = Bayesian

Focal Elem.
A
B
C

X

S3PCR5 (X, Y ) , m2 (X)2

this example is given in Table II for convenience. This is
the major difference between PCR5 and Dempster’s rule,
not to mention the management of conflicting information
in the fusion process of course.
In summary, and using ⊕ symbol to denote the generic
fusion process, one has
– With Dempster’s rule :

•

X

S2PCR5 (X, Y ) , m1 (X)2

X

m(Z k Y )

(11)

Z∈2Θ
Z∩X6=∅

(6)

Θ

X1 ,X2 ∈2
X1 ∩X2 =X

The ”true” unknown (non Bayesian) conditional subjective
probability, denoted P (X||Y ), must satisfy

9 More

sophisticated conditioning rules have been proposed in [18], Vol. 2.
deals better with partial conflicts than other rules unlike Dempster’s
rule, it does not increase the non-specificity of the result unlike Dubois &
Prade or Yager’s rule, and it does respond to new information unlike Smets
rule.

Bel(X k Y ) ≤ P (X||Y ) ≤ P l(X||Y )

10 It

(12)

11 One could also define m(∅ k ∅) = 1 and m(X 6= ∅ k ∅) = 0 which
however would not be a normal bba.
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that m(.||Y ) = P CR5(m1 (.), m2 (.)) ?PLet’s denote
m1 (θi ) = xi , where all xi ∈ [0, 1] and ni=1 xi = 1.
We need to find all these xi . We now combine m1 (.)
with m2 (.) using PCR5 fusion rule. We transfer xi , for
∀i 6= j0 , to θi and θj0 proportionally with respect to
w
their corresponding masses, xi and 1 respectively: xθii =

P (X||Y ) can be seen as an imprecise probability and used
within IPT (Imprecise Probability Theory) [23] if necessary,
or can be approximated from m(.||Y ) using some probabilistic
transforms, typically the pignistic transform [19] or the DSmP
transform [18] (Vol.3, Chap. 3). The search for direct closeform expressions of Bel(X k Y ) and P l(X k Y ) from
Bel1 (.) and P l1 (.) appears to be an open difficult problem.

wθj

0

1

while αj0

IV. D ECONDITIONING

i
whence wθi = xi +1
and wθj0 =
Pn
Pn
xi
= xj0 + i=1 xi +1 or αj0 = 1− i=1

i6=j0

i6=j0

xi
xi +1 ,
x2i
xi +1 .

Since we need to find all unknowns xi , i = 1, . . . , n,
x2i
= ai , for i 6= j0 for xi ;
we need to solve xP
i +1
n
xi
since αj0 = xj0 +
i=1 xi +1 = aj0 , we get xj0 =
i6=jP
0
Pn
n
i
= 1 − i=1 xi .
aj0 − i=1 xix+1

In the previous section we have proposed a new non
Bayesian conditioning rule based on PCR5. This rule follows
Shafer’s idea except that we use PCR5 instead of Dempster’s
rule because we have shown the better efficiency of PCR5
to deal with conflicting information w.r.t. other rules. In this
section, we also show the great benefit of such PCR5 rule for
the deconditioning problem. The belief conditioning problem
consists in finding a way to update any prior belief function
(Bel(.), P l() or m(.)) with a new information related with the
(belief of) occurrence in a given conditional proposition of the
fusion space, say Y , in order to get a new belief function called
conditional belief function. The deconditioning problem is the
inverse (dual) problem of conditioning. It consists to retrieve
the prior belief function from a given posterior/conditional
belief function. Deconditioning has not been investigated in
deep so far in the literature (to the knowledge of the authors)
since is is usually considered as impossible to achieve12,
it may present great interest for applications in advanced
information systems when only a posterior belief is available
(say provided by an human or an AI-expert system), but for
some reason we need to compute a new conditioning belief
based on a different conditional hypothesis. This motivates
our research for developing deconditioning techniques. Since
Bel(.), P l() are in one-to-one correspondence with the basic
belief assignment (bba) mass m(.), we focus our analysis on
the deconditioning of the conditional bba. More simply stated,
we want to see if for any given conditional bba m(.||Y ) we
can compute m1 (.) such that m(.||Y ) = P CR5(m1 (.), m2 (.))
with m2 (Y ) = 1 and where P CR5(m1 (.), m2 (.)) denotes
the PCR5 fusion of m1 (.) with m2 (.). Let’s examine the two
distinct cases for the deconditiong problem depending on the
(Bayesian or non-Bayesian) nature of the prior m1 (.).
• Case of Bayesian prior m1 (.): Let Θ = {θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θn },
with n ≥ 2, Shafer’s model, where all θi are singletons.
Let m1 : Θ 7→ [0, 1] be a Bayesian bba/mass. In that case,
the deconditioning problem admits a unique solution
and we can always compute m1 (.) from m(.||Y ) but
two distinct cases must be analyzed depending on the
cardinality of the conditional term Y .
Case 1: When Y is a singleton, i.e. |Y | = 1. Suppose
m2 (Y ) = 1, with Y = θj0 , for j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
where j0 is fixed. Since the bba’s m1 (.) and m2 (.) are
both Bayesian in this case, m(.||Y ) is also a Bayesian
bba (property P3),
P therefore m(θi ||Y ) = ai , where all
ai ∈ [0, 1] with ni=1 ai = 1. How to find m1 (.) such
12 This

x2

xi
xi +1

=

i6=j0

•

i6=j0

Case 2: When Y is not a singleton, i.e. |Y | > 1 (Y can
be a partial or total ignorance). Suppose m2 (Y ) = 1,
with Y = θj1 ∪ θj2 ∪ . . . ∪ θjp , where all j1 , j2 , . . . ,
jp are different and they belong to {1, 2, . . . , n}, 2 ≤
p ≤ n. We keep the same notations for m(.||Y ) and
Bayesian m1 (.). The set {j1 , j2 , . . . , jp } is denoted J
for notation convenience. Similarly, using PCR5 rule we
transfer xi , ∀i ∈
/ J, to xi and to the ignorance Y =
θj1 ∪ . . . ∪ θjp proportionally with respect to xi and 1
respectively (as done in case 1). So, xi for i ∈
/ J is found
x2i
from solving the equation xi +1
= ai , which gives13 xi =
p
(ai + a2i + 4ai )/2; and xjr = ajr for r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}.
Case of Non-Bayesian prior m1 (.):
Unfortunately, when m1 (.) is Non-Bayesian, the (PCR5based) deconditioning problem doesn’t admit one unique
solution in general (see the example 2.1 in the next
section). But the method used to decondition PCR5 when
m1 (.) is Bayesian can be generalized for m1 (.) nonBayesian in the following way: 1) We need to know the
focal elements of m1 (.), then we denote the masses of
these elements by say x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ; 2)Then we combine
using the conjunctive rule m1 (.) with m2 (Y ) = 1, where
Y can be a singleton or an ignorance; 3) Afterwards, we
use PCR5 rule and we get some results like: fi (x1 , ..., xn )
for each element, where i = 1, 2, . . .. Since we know
the results of PCR5 as m(.||Y ) = ai for each focal
element, then we form a system of non-linear equations:
fi (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) = ai and we need to solve it. Such
systems of equations however can admit several solutions.
We can select a solution satisfying an additional criterion
like by example the minimum (or the maximum) of
specificity depending of the kind of Non-Bayesian prior
we need to use.
V. E XAMPLES

A. Example 1: Conditioning of a Bayesian prior belief
Let’s consider Θ = {A, B, C}, Shafer’s model, and the
prior bba’s m1 (.) and m01 (.) given in Table IV and the
conditional evidence Y = A ∪ B.
q
solution xi = (ai − a2i + 4ai )/2 must be discarded since it is
negative and cannot be considered as a mass of belief.
13 The

truly happens when classical Bayes conditioning is used.
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property. If one approximates16 the conditional probability by
the mid-value of their lower and upper bounds17, one gets
values given in Table VII.

Table IV
BAYESIAN PRIORS ( INPUTS ).
Focal Elem.
A
B
C

m1
0.49
0.49
0.02

m01 (.)
0.01
0.01
0.98

Table VII
C ONDITIONAL APPROXIMATE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES .
2Θ
∅
A
B
C
Y = A∪B
A∪C
B∪C
A∪B∪C

The significance of having two cases in the Bayesian prior
case is straighforward. We just want to show that two different
priors can yield to the same posterior bba with Bayes/SCR rule
and thus we cannot retrieve these two distinct priors cases from
the posterior bba. We show that the total deconditioning is
possible however when using our non-Bayesian conditioning
rule. SCR and PCR5-based conditioning of m1 (.) and m01 (.)
are given14 in Table V. One sees that SCR of the two distinct
bba’s m1 (.) and m01 (.) yield the same posterior/conditional
bba m(.|Y ) which means that in this very simple Bayesian
prior case, the deconditioning of m(.|Y ) is impossible to
obtain since at least two solutions15 for the prior beliefs are
admissible. The results provided by PCR5-based conditioning
makes more sense in authors’ point of view since it better takes
into account the degree of conflicting information in the conditioning process. One sees that two distinct Bayesian priors
yield two distinct posterior bba’s with PCR5-based conditioning. If one examines the belief and plausibility functions, one
gets, using notation ∆(.|Y ) = [Bel(.|Y ), P l(.|Y )], ∆0 (.|Y ) =
[Bel0 (.|Y ), P l0 (.|Y )], ∆(.||Y ) = [Bel(.||Y ), P l(.||Y )] and
∆0 (.||Y ) = [Bel0 (.||Y ), P l0 (.||Y )]:

m(.|Y )
0.5
0.5
0
0

m0 (.|Y )
0.5
0.5
0
0

m(.||Y )
0.4900
0.4900
0.00039215
0.01960785

m0 (.||Y )
0.0100
0.0100
0.48505051
0.49494949

PROBABILITIES
∆(.|Y ) = ∆0 (.|Y )
[0,0]
[0.5,0.5]
[0.5,0.5]
[0,0]
[1,1]
[0.5,0.5]
[0.5,0.5]
[1,1]

∆(.||Y )
[0,0]
[0.4900, 0.5096]
[0.4900, 0.5096]
[0.0004, 0.0004]
[0.9996,0.9996]
[ 0.4904, 0.5100]
[ 0.4904, 0.5100]
[1,1]

∆0 (.||Y )
[0,0]
[ 0.0100, 0.5050]
[ 0.0100, 0.5050]
[0.4850,0.4850]
[0.5150,0.5150]
[0.4950, 0.9900]
[0.4950, 0.9900]
[1,1]

The interval ∆(.|Y ) corresponds to lower and upper bounds
of conditional subjective probabilities P (.|Y ) and ∆(.||Y )
corresponds to lower and upper bounds of P (.||Y ) (similarly
for ∆0 (.|Y ) and ∆0 (.||Y )). From the Table VI, one sees that
the property P2 is verified and we get an imprecise conditional
probability. One sees that contrariwise to SCR (equivalent
to Bayes rule in this case), one gets Bel(Y ||Y ) < 1 and
also P l(Y ||Y ) < 1. ∆(.||Y ) and ∆0 (.||Y ) are very different
because priors were also very different. This is an appealing
14 Due

P 0 (.||Y )
0
0.2575
0.2575
0.4850
0.5150
0.7425
0.7425
1

The deconditioning of the posterior bba’s m(. k Y ) given
in the Table V is done using the principle described in
section IV (when m1 (.) is assumed Bayesian and for case
2). We denote the unknowns m1 (A) = x1 , m1 (B) = x2
and m1 (C) = x3 . Since Y = A ∪ B and J = {1, 2}, we
solve the following system of equations (with the constraint
xi ∈ [0, 1]): x1 = a1 = 0.49, x2 = a2 = 0.49 and
x23 /(x3 + 1) = a3 = 0.00039215. Therefore, one gets
after deconditioning m1 (A) = 0.49, m1 (B) = 0.49 and
m1 (C) = 0.02. Similarly, the deconditioning of m0 (. k Y )
given in the Table V yields m01 (A) = 0.01, m01 (B) = 0.01
and m01 (C) = 0.98.
Note that, contrarywise to Bayes or to Jeffrey’s rules [8],
[11], [21], it is possible to update the prior opinion about an
event A even if P (A) = 0 using this Non-Bayesian rule. For
example, let’s consider Θ = {A, B, C}, Shafer’s model and
the prior Bayesian mass m1(A) = 0, m1(B) = 0.3 and m1(C)
= 0.7, i.e. Bel1(A) = P1(A) = P l(A) = 0. Assume that the
conditional evidence is Y = A∪B, then one gets with SCR
m(B|A ∪ B) = 1 and with PCR5-based conditioning m(B k A
∪ B) = 0.30, m(A ∪ B k A ∪ B) = 0.41176 and m(C k A
∪ B) = 0.28824, which means that P (A|A ∪
B) = 0 with SCR/Bayes rule (i.e. no update on A), whereas
[Bel(A k A ∪ B), P l(A k A ∪ B)] = [0, 0.41176], [Bel(B k

Table VI
C ONDITIONAL LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS OF CONDITIONAL
2Θ
∅
A
B
C
Y = A∪B
A∪C
B∪C
A∪B∪C

P (.||Y )
0
0.4998
0.4998
0.0004
0.9996
0.5002
0.5002
1

When the conditioning hypothesis supports the prior
belief (as for m1 (.) and m2 (.) which are in low conflict)
the PCR5-based conditioning reacts as SCR (as Bayes
rule when dealing with Bayesian priors) and P (X.||Y ) is
very close to P (.|Y ). When the prior and the conditional
evidences are highly conflicting (i.e. like m01 (.) and m2 (.),
PCR5-based conditioning rule is much more prudent than
Shafer’s rule and that’s why it allows the possibility to have
P (Y ||Y ) < 1. Such property doesn’t violate the fundamental
axioms (nonnegativity, unity and additivity) of Kolmogorov
axiomatic theory of probabilities and this can be verified
easily in our example. In applications, it is much better
to preserve all available information and to work directly
with conditional bba’s whenever possible rather than with
approximate subjective conditional probabilities.

Table V
C ONDITIONAL BBA’ S .
Focal Elem.
A
B
C
A∪B

P (.|Y ) = P 0 (.|Y )
0
0.5
0.5
0
1
0.5
0.5
1

16 When the lower bound is equal to the upper bound, one gets the exact
probability value.
17 More sophisticated transformations could be used instead as explained in
[18], Vol. 3.

to space limitation constraints, the verification is left to the reader.
an infinite number of solutions exists.

15 Actually
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A ∪ B), P l(B k A ∪ B)] = [0.30, 0.71176] and [Bel(C k
A ∪ B), P l(C k A ∪ B)] = [0.28823, 0.28823], that is P (A k
A ∪ B) ∈ [0, 0.41176]. Typically, if one approximates P (. k
A ∪ B) by the mid-value of its lower and upper bounds, one
will obtain P (A k A ∪ B) = 0.20588 (i.e. a true update of
the prior probability of A), P (B k A ∪ B) = 0.50588 and
P (C k A ∪ B) = 0.28824.

VI. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a new Non-Bayesian conditioning rule (denoted k ) based on the Proportional Conflict
Redistribution (PCR) rule of combination developed in DSmT
framework. This new conditioning rule offers the advantage to
take fully into account the level of conflict between the prior
and the conditional evidences for updating belief functions. It
is truly Non-Bayesian since it doesn’t satisfy Bayes principle
because it allows P (X k X) or Bel(X k X) to be less than
one. We have also shown that this approach allows to solve
the deconditioning (dual) problem for the class of Bayesian
priors. More investigations on the deconditioning problem of
Non-Bayesian priors need to be done and comparisons of
this new rule with respect to the main alternatives of Bayes
rule proposed in the literature (typically Jeffrey’s rule and its
extensions, Planchet’s rule, etc) will be presented in details in
a forthcoming publication.

B. Example 2: Conditioning of a Non-Bayesian prior belief
Example 2.1: Let’s consider now Θ = {A, B, C}, Shafer’s
model, the conditioning hypothesis Y = A ∪ B and the
following Non-Bayesian priors:
Table VIII
N ON -BAYESIAN PRIORS ( INPUTS ).
Focal Elem.
A
B
C
A∪B
A∪B∪C

m1
0.20
0.30
0.10
0.25
0.15

m01 (.)
0.20
0.30
0.10
0.15
0.25
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The conflict between m1 (.) and m2 (Y ) = 1 and between
m01 (.) and m2 (Y ) = 1 is 0.10 in both cases. The results of
the conditioning are given in Table IX. One sees that when
distinct priors are Non-Bayesian, it can happen that PCR5based conditioning rule yields also the same posterior bba’s.
This result shows that in general with Non-Bayesian priors the
PCR5-based deconditioning cannot provide a unique solution,
unless extra information and/constraints on the prior belief are
specified as shown in the next example.
Table IX
C ONDITIONAL BBA’ S .
Focal Elem.
A
B
C
A∪B

m(.|Y )
0.222
0.333
0
0.445

m0 (.|Y )
0.222
0.333
0
0.445

m(. k Y )
0.20
0.30
0.01
0.49

m0 (. k Y )
0.20
0.30
0.01
0.49

Example 2.2: Let’s consider now Θ = {A, B, C, D}, Shafer’s
model, the conditional evidence Y = C ∪ D and the posterior
bba m(. k C ∪D) given in the right column of the table below:
Table X
C ONDITIONAL BBA’ S .
Focal Elem.

m1 (.)

A

x1

B

x2

C ∪D

x3

mP CR5 (.)
x2
1
1+x1
x2
2
1+x
x1 2
x2
x3 +
+
1+x1
1+x2

m(. k A)
0.0333
0.1667
0.8000

If we assume that the focal elements of the prior bba m1 (.)
are the same as for the posterior bba m(. k C ∪ D), then with
such extra assumption, the deconditioning problem admits a
unique solution which is obtained by solving the system of
x21
three equations according to Table X; that is 1+x
= 0.0333,
1
x2

2
whence x1 ≈ 0.2; 1+x
= 0.1667, whence x2 ≈ 0.5; x3 +
2
x1
x2
+
=
0.8000;
whence x1 ≈ 0.3. Therefore, the
1+x1
1+x2
deconditioning of m(. k C ∪ D) provides the unique NonBayesian solution m1 (A) = 0.2, m1 (B) = 0.5 and m1 (C ∪
D) = 0.3.
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